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The Supreme Court has given the jurisdiction-junkies among us two new
precedents to mull over: Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,S.A. v. Brown and
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.2 Goodyear and McIntyre address some

of the classic foundational questions in personal jurisdiction, but fail to answer
others and possibly even raise some new ones.
Among the classics, the Supreme Court revisited the familiar question
whether state lines form the boundaries of different sovereignties in some
important way, or whether they are simply proxies for physical distance and
therefore indicative of party inconvenience. On this matter, the position that the
Court took-boundaries are important as a matter of principle 3-- does not come
as a surprise. Despite previous suggestions that distance and inconvenience are
relevant in determining personal jurisdiction,4 the Court emphasized that
boundaries have no inherent relationship with convenience.5 This is as it should
be: anyone who has driven across Rhode Island would be hard-pressed to think
of states per se as proxies for either distance or convenience.

Howard Holtzmann Professor of International Law at Yale Law School.
• J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School 2012; B.A. in Philosophy, Stanford University 2006.
1.
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
2.
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
3.
See id. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (holding that "jurisdiction is in the first instance a
question of authority rather than fairness" and thus that "personal jurisdiction requires a forum-byforum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis").
4.
See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) ("An 'estimate of the
inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or
principal place of business is relevant ....
(quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d
139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930))).
5.
See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (rejecting fairness as the criterion
for determining the propriety of personal jurisdiction).
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The strongest message from Goodyear and McIntyre is a reaffirmation that
state sovereignty is central to the Court's philosophy of what it means to have a
federal system; the states created the federal government much more than the
federal government created the states. But although the Court's conviction that
states are sovereign entities for jurisdictional purposes is nothing new, it does
pose some new, or at least unanswered, questions. As we will argue, it is
difficult to see sovereignty as the analytic lynchpin of personal jurisdiction
because nothing in the concept of sovereignty itself explains what is at stake for
individual liberty. Or to put the point another way, in some cases a state's
exercise of jurisdiction offends individual due process rights and in some cases it
does not, but an appeal to sovereign authority does nothing to distinguish one
case from the other since the entire question is whether the state has that
authority.
The limited analytic leverage that sovereignty provides explains why
Mclntrye resorts to consideration of "whether a defendant has followed a course
of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a
given sovereign." 7 But this consideration only kicks the can down the road: why
does the state have authority over an out-of-state defendant whose course of
conduct is in some way "directed," but not over one whose course of conduct
merely affected the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of the
sovereign-as in McIntyre? The answer must be given in terms that explain
what is at stake for the defendant, not the sovereign, since limits on personal
jurisdiction subsist in due process. Or, as an alternative formulation of the
point, what McIntyre and Goodyear lack is an explanation of the connection
between the individual defendant's interests and the sovereign's.
That the latest personal jurisdiction cases do not fully explain the connection
between the individual and the sovereign also does not come as a surprise.
Exertions of jurisdiction are acts of governmental coercion, and thus implicate
theories of political legitimacy and justification. 9 To the extent, then, that
theories of personal jurisdiction supervene on political theory, the absence of a
clear answer to these questions is both more and less startling. It is less startling
because the propriety of coercive power is an overwhelmingly complex and
contested subject. Personal jurisdiction, as a relatively small subfield in civil

6. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 ("[A] State may authorize its courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant has 'certain minimum contacts
with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice' (alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316)); J. McIntyre,
131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) ("And if another State were to assert jurisdiction in an
inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each State has a sovereignty
that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States.").
7. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion).
8.
See id. (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982)).
9.
See id. at 2785 ("Due process protects the defendant's right not to be coerced except by
lawful judicial power.").
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procedure and constitutional law, should not be expected to make conclusive
contributions to political theory. It is more startling because theories of political
justification are so intellectually rich. 10
If there is a key contribution that could be made to courts' understanding of

personal jurisdiction, it is a fully articulated theoretical justification that
delineates the circumstances under which extraterritorial defendants may be
subject to the jurisdiction of a state. The intuitions underlying limits on personal
jurisdiction are strong. For example, the Goodyear decision was entirely
unanimous: a foreign corporation that conducted no business in North Carolina
and otherwise had only the most tangential connections to the state should not be

subject to the jurisdiction of North Carolina."

But the analytic mechanisms for

deciding hard cases remain underdeveloped.
In addition to the need for a fully articulated political justification for
personal jurisdiction, Goodyear and McIntyre also raise a number of collateral

issues about the meaning and consequences of state sovereignty. These issues
are collateral because their resolution may be impacted by whatever political
justification is ultimately successful but nonetheless constitute independent and
for further research and
substantive areas ..
.
12 And, of course, some of
. .development.
.
these issues are as old as personal jurisdiction itself -a

testament to the need

for further endeavor by scholars of jurisdiction. The three collateral issues we
will consider in addition to the political justification for personal jurisdiction are:
9

Causality: When a defendant is not present in a forum but is
involved in a chain of events resulting in a loss or injury in the
forum, under what conditions can the defendant be regarded as
having caused the loss or injury such that the forum will have
personal jurisdiction? There are many candidates-foreseeability,

10. Although it is clearly impossible to list all the works in political theory that may bear on
questions of jurisdiction, some are especially influential. See generally, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 88-146 (1974) (arguing for legitimacy from consent); A. JOHN
SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 101-142 (1979) (arguing that fairplay arguments can be successful in such limited circumstances that they have little hope of
legitimating extant governments); Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 111 (2003) (discussing theories of legitimacy with respect to the U.S. Constitution and arguing
for legitimacy based on substantive notions of rights); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?,
64 PHIL. REv. 175 (1955) (elucidating the relationship between moral rights and a natural right to
be free from certain forms of coercion); George Klosko, Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and
Political Obligation, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 241 (1987) (arguing that the provision of benefits can in
certain circumstances legitimate coercive power); John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of
Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) (developing the rough sketches of a
fair-play argument for legitimacy).
11. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850-52 (explaining that the foreign defendants had no contact
with North Carolina except to the extent that North Carolina residents had been injured by the
defendants' allegedly defective tires in France and that other Goodyear affiliates had distributed a
very small number of the defendants' tires-none of the type involved in the incident giving rise to
litigation-in North Carolina).
12. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
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probability, etc.-but which is correct, and on what criteria would
one decide?
Symmetry: Is the overriding focus on protecting the defendant really
sound, given that the decision not to assert jurisdiction has the same
effect on the plaintiff as the decision to assert jurisdiction has on the
defendant?
InternationalDue Process: What difference does it (should it) make

that the defendant hails from, and restricted its conduct to, another
country, as opposed to another state?
The discussion below expands a bit on what these questions mean; explores
briefly why we think that these problems matter; and, in some cases, briefly
suggests tentative solutions or avenues for further work.
I.

OPEN QUESTIONS
A.

PoliticalJustification

The fundamental problem in personal jurisdiction is explaining when states
may assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial defendants and when they may not.
Courts and commentators have developed various concepts for distinguishing
these two sets, among them notions of causality, reciprocal contacts, and implied
consent. 13 But the underlying theoretical justification for distinguishing them
remains vexingly illusive. Why are there persons not subject to the jurisdiction
of a state? If the jurisdiction of states were extended to everyone, what would be
lost?
Three traditional justifications for limiting the power of states over
extraterritorial defendants are consent, inconvenience, and expectations.
Unfortunately, they all have fatal flaws. A recurring and more promising, but
still problematic, justification depends on notions of federalism and
sovereignty. 14 And the necessity of coercion in solving collective action
problems, colloquially known as the provision of benefits, remains an

13. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) ("California is the focal point both of
the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California
based on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California." (citing World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 37 (1971))); Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703 ("Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction
represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived....

A variety of

legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent to the personal
jurisdiction of the court."); Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum
Law, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1237, 1257 (2011) ("A forum without minimum contacts lacks the power
to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, not solely because the defendant would find it
inconvenient, but also because the forum state lacks sufficient interests to justify an assertion of
adjudicative power.").
14. The latest example of state sovereignty as political justification for limits on personal
jurisdiction appears, of course, in J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786-87.
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underdeveloped but promising justification. 15 The future of personal jurisdiction
depends in large part on grappling with these political justifications and perhaps
others.
1. TraditionalJustifications
As with most political theory, consent is a starting place. The affinity
between consent and the legitimation of coercive power stems from the
undisputed fact that consent is sufficient to legitimate coercive power: a basic
assumption across the law, and particularly in contracts, is that genuine consent
to an arrangement justifies enforcing that arrangement, or some approximation
thereof. 16 Given that consent is a sufficient condition for coercive power, it has
been natural to assume that it is also a necessary condition. This reasoning is
embodied in an early line of cases, 17 but
18 was famously banished by the Court in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.
The problem with using consent to justify the use of coercive power is that
the semantic content of "consent" is too limited to justify coercive power in the
vast majority of situations. Any conventional definition of consent, e.g.,
deliberate manifestation of agreement,1 9 will leave out the vast majority of
corporations and individuals because the vast majority of corporations and
individuals never deliberately manifest agreement to coercive power and have no
reason to. Corporations enter new states to earn profit and expand their business,
just as individuals travel to, or interact with, new states because it is personally,
socially, or professionally advantageous. People have motives that need not (and
generally do not) involve deliberate manifestations of assent to the states'
coercive power.
Moves to implied consent do not fare any better because they are strangely
circular. If some actions impliedly manifest consent to jurisdiction and others do
not, how do we tell them apart? And more particularly, how do we tell them
apart when the defendant can perpetually deny that his actions manifested
consent? Any litigant can maintain, probably truthfully, that she took the actions

15. Indeed, the idea that the provision of benefits has a role in justifying exertions of
jurisdiction has been around as long as the doctrine of personal jurisdiction:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a
state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that
privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are
connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation
to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be
undue.
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
16. See, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1972) (using contractual
consent to justify choice of jurisdiction).
17. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (upholding a state statute which
implied consent to service of process for all out of state motorists driving on its highways).
18. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318-19.
19. See BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009).
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at issue with no reference whatsoever to the authority of a state. So what actions
create implied consent? Ultimately, consent is too strong a concept to be useful
in legitimating coercive power generally and extraterritorial assertions of
jurisdiction in particular.
The failure of consent brings us to inconvenience, or the idea that defendants
should not be forced to litigate in a distant or obscure forum. The personal
jurisdiction cases are riddled with language sugesting that inconvenience is a
correct understanding of defendants' interests.
But, as other commentators
have pointed out, defending in a different state just is not that inconvenient. 21
And more importantly, an emphasis on inconvenience would be anomalous in
constitutional doctrine.
"[T]here is simply no historical concern over
convenience as an additional component of due process ....
For example, there are absolutely no constitutional limits on the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts: "There is... nothing in the Constitution which
forbids Congress to enact that... a circuit court... shall, by process served
anywhere in the United States, have the power to bring before it all the parties
necessary to its decision." 23 While there are geographic limits on the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts, theg are provided for statutorily and could thus
be repealed at any time by Congress.
The requirements of the Due Process Clause cannot be applied so
selectively. To maintain consistency, one must either rework entire areas of
constitutional law by incorporating protections against inconvenience, or jettison

20. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 ("An 'estimate of the conveniences' which would
result to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of business is
relevant .. " (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (1930))).
21. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of PersonalJurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 95 (1990) ("Depositions
and other discovery devices take place anywhere the parties designate, and are not tied to the forum.
The only events tied to the forum are those requiring judicial supervision, such as pretrial motions.
Motions require the presence of counsel, but a party is free to hire a lawyer close to the courthouse.
The only time a party is likely to travel is in the improbable event that the case goes to trial."
(footnote omitted)).
22. A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. Cl. L. REV.
617,630 (2006).
23. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); accord Miss. Publ'g
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) ("Congress could provide for service of process
anywhere in the United States." (citing Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925);
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. at 604; Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838)));
Robertson, 268 U.S. at 622 ("Congress has power, likewise, to provide that the process of every
district court shall run into every part of the United States." (citing Toland, 37 U.S. (12. Pet.) at 328;
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. at 604)).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2006) (providing that a suit in diversity may only be filed in a
district in which the defendants reside, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
case occurred, or a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action commenced),
amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63,
§ 202(1)(b)(l)-(3), 125 Stat. 758, 763 (2011).
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the idea that inconvenience can animate due process restrictions on personal
jurisdiction. The latter route is preferable.
Moving on to other rationales, the Court has at various times suggested that
the expectations of defendants can serve as a limit on the jurisdiction of state
courts.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson contains perhaps the best

statement of the Court's integration of expectations in personal jurisdiction
cases:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis... is that the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. The Due
Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly administration of the laws,"
gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance
as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable
25
to suit.
26

Despite such language and its application in a range of cases, the Court has
never made expectations the cornerstone of its Due Process analysis-and with
good reason.
If the problem with consent was that its semantic content was too strong and
attempts to weaken that content resulted in circularity, the problem with
expectations is that it has too little semantic content and uniformly results in
circularity. People expect the world to work in the way the world works. "Any
expectation that a defendant has of avoiding an out-of-state court is a function of
the jurisdictional rules themselves. Thus... [expectations] cannot justify the
contents of jurisdictional rules, it simply describes a consequence of having such
,,27
rules.
a justification
for limits
on state court
jurisdiction, it is almost
impossibleAs
to take
the expectations
of defendants
seriously.
2.

Federalism and Sovereign Authority

As an historical matter, federalism and state sovereignty (federalism) have
been present in the personal jurisdiction cases from the beginning. In Pennoyer

25. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (citations
omitted) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
26. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978) ("We therefore see no
basis on which it can be said that appellant could reasonably have anticipated being 'haled before a
[California] court."' (alteration in original) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)));
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216 ("[Alppellants had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware
court.").

27. Borchers, supra note 21, at 94; cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 310 n.16
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Such a standard need be no more uncertain than the Court's test 'in
which few answers will be written in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among
them the shades are innumerable.'" (internal citation omitted) (quoting Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92)).
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v. Neff,28 the Court held "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and

sovereignty over persons and property within its territory" and thus that "no
State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory." 29 Similarly, in InternationalShoe, the Court referred to
limits on the jurisdiction of states within "the context of our federal system of
government.",30 Later cases took up the banner in slightly more detail, arguing,
for example, that the Framers intended the states to retain "the sovereign power
to try causes in their courts," and that "[tihe sovereignty of each State, in turn,
implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limitation
express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment.",3 1 McIntyre is but the latest case to adopt some form of
32
this line of thinking.
The idea here is that a state could use the operation of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to efface the borders of its sister states and threaten their
authority. 33 By way of illustration, Full Faith and Credit requires that any final
34
judgment rendered in New York be given the same effect in Connecticut.
Thus, were New York able to declare its courts open to the claims arising from
any auto accident in Connecticut between Connecticut residents, New York
could effectively undermine Connecticut's ability and right to determine causes
of action within its borders. Limits on the personal jurisdiction of one state may
thus be seen as protecting other states from encroachment. Or to put the point
more sharply, personal jurisdiction is the constitutional equivalent of Las
Vegas's trademark advertising campaign: 35 what happens in state x, stays in state
X.
Federalism is one of the stronger rationales offered for limits on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts. However, a problem with conceptualizing federalism
as a limit on state court jurisdiction is that it neglects to provide any account of
the individual interests at stake. There is nothing in the concept of states or
sovereignty that can tell you why it is inappropriate or appropriate to exercise
coercive powers on individuals themselves. Because it neglects this important
aspect, federalism is difficult to reconcile with the personal jurisdiction doctrine

28. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
29. Id. at 722 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19-20 (2d
ed. 1841); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11(--11 (George Grafton

Wilson ed., William S. Hein & Co. photo. reprint 1995) (Richard Henry Dana, Jr. ed., 1866)).
30. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
31. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.
32. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion).
33. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 567-68 (2008).
34. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
35. See VISIT LAS VEGAS, http://www.visitlasvegas.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2012) ("What
happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas.").
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36
as it exists in the case law,
as it is located in the Constitution, and as it is
38
interpreted procedurally.
Federalism can explain limits on states' extraterritorial assertions of
jurisdiction in certain paradigmatic cases. As in the example above, it is clear
that the courts of New York should not be allowed to unilaterally substitute for
the courts of Connecticut. However, federalism cannot explain other limits. In
World-Wide Volkswagen, the defendant car dealership and regional-distributor
sold an Audi to a family in New York, the gas tank of which exploded while
they were traveling through Oklahoma. 39 The injured family members filed suit
in Oklahoma state court. But because the defendants had no other connection
with Oklahoma (they did business solely in New York's tri-state area), the Court
held that the Due Process Clause prevented Oklahoma's assertion of
jurisdictiona'-a result that cannot be attributed to concerns about federalism and
interstate sovereignty. It is difficult to argue that Oklahoma was transgressing
the interests of New York by adjudicating a products liability claim resulting
from an explosion on its highways. Worries about sovereignty are similarly
difficult to reconcile with the reasoning in cases involving sovereign
governments.4 2
If notions of federalism and state sovereignty are to play a critical role in the
future of personal jurisdiction, they will either have to be tied to individual
interests, or the doctrine will have to undergo substantial change.
.37

3.

Benefaction and FairPlay

One promising but underdeveloped idea revolves around the benefits that are
enabled by coercive state action. Often known as "fair play," the suggestion that
the election of benefits to a defendant can legitimate jurisdiction over that
defendant has made appearances in most personal jurisdiction cases. For
example, in McIntyre, the Court repeatedly emphasized that "the exercise of

36. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (discussing limits on personal jurisdiction as limited solely by the
individual rights conferred in the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
37. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) ("Personal
jurisdiction, of course, restricts 'judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty,' for due process protects the individual's right to be subject only to lawful
power." (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir.v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982))).
38. Individuals can waive objections to personal jurisdiction. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 12(h)(l).
39. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 298-99 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
42. If concerns about sovereignty truly motivated limits on personal jurisdiction, one might
expect it to be an especially acute issue when defendants in foreign countries are involved. Yet the
interests of foreign governments are barely mentioned. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987) (noting the international interests at play but
providing minimal discussion and analysis); infra Part I.D.
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judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant 'purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.' 43 Why does seeking the benefits and
protection of the laws legitimate jurisdiction? Answering this question may be
pivotal to the future of personal jurisdiction.
States provide certain affirmative goods and benefits, most of which redound
to the benefit of those who are territorially located in the state. 44 For example,
the creation of traffic rules and the enforcement of those rules is a benefit to
those who travel within the state or conduct commerce within the state. And to
the extent that the coercive enforcement of traffic laws is necessary to the
provision of those benefits, those who do benefit can have no in-principle
objection to the enforcement of those laws. After all, benefaction is a relative
concept and to even call something a benefit is to admit that, on the whole, it is
better than not. Otherwise it would not be a benefit! It follows that the
necessary conditions for a benefit, in our case some level of enforcement, must
also be on the whole beneficial since, ex hypothesi, they enable something that is
altogether beneficial.
Critically, even persons located extraterritorially may benefit from the laws
of a state. An extraterritorial merchant who sends goods into the state as part of
the conduct of his business also benefits from the conditions the state has
enabled. To the extent, then, that the enforcement of some law (including
against the merchant) is necessary in the enablement of those benefits (e.g., the
social conditions enabled by product liability torts), the merchant can have no
objection to coercion since, ex hypothesi, he benefits.
The above sketch is a rough but promising direction for the political
justification of personal jurisdiction. It is, of course, subject to counterarguments
and examples. Consider, for example, Randy Barnett's strongest
counterexample:
To better appreciate why the nonconsensual receipt of benefits
cannot be the source of a duty of obedience, imagine a very generous
master who provides all essentials and even a degree of choice or
freedom to his vassals--or house slaves-which they nevertheless are
unable to refuse. Are the slaves of sufficiently bounteous masters
morally obligated to obey them? What is the problem with this entire

43. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 . Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109 ("Minimum contacts must
have a basis in 'some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."'
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))).
44. Because such goods redound as a merely contingent matter (i.e., they are not by
definition territorial), fair play avoids problems with circularity. See generally Lea Brilmayer, The
William B. Lockhart Lecture, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1989)
(arguing that territoriality and not consent explain exercises of jurisdiction).
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line of argument? 45
The obvious answer is that what is lacking is the
consent of the slave.

An even more obvious answer is that slavery bears absolutely no necessary
relationship to the provision of benefits. In stipulating that having a generous
master is a benefit to slaves, presumably Barnett's presupposed counterfactual is
one where the slaves have an abject and avaricious master. But in either
situation, the slaves are slaves, so the benefits Barnett mentions could not
possibly be thought to justify slavery.
Another counterargument seizes on causality. What does it mean to say that
a merchant benefits? Or, in other words, what causal connection must obtain
between a merchant and events in the forum state such that jurisdiction is
proper? Because notions of causality are an issue implicated under every theory
of political justification, they represent a further frontier for personal jurisdiction.
B.

Causality

In some cases, it is clearly possible to say that the defendant's actions had
the requisite causal connection with events in the forum state. For example, a
Massachusetts domiciliary who drives into Texas and recklessly causes a traffic
accident in Dallas took actions (causing the traffic accident) that are sufficiently
connected to Texas to give Texas jurisdiction. 46 Or more generally, challenges
are rare in cases where the defendant enters the forum state and engages in
legally culpable conduct there, causing injury.
In other cases, it is clear that the defendant's actions do not have the
requisite causal connection. In Goodyear, the foreign defendants had no
connection with North Carolina except to the extent that a North Carolina
resident was allegedly killed by one of their defective tires in France, and to the
extent that a very small number of their tires, none of the type involved in the
accident, were distributed by other Goodyear affiliates in North Carolina.47
Goodyear thus represents one end of the spectrum: the defendants' actions
clearly did not have the requisite causal connection with North Carolina.48
That Goodyear was even litigated, however, is instructive. Personal
jurisdiction cases where the defendant remains outside the state but takes actions
having an impact in the state are legion. The most common fact pattern involves
a business that manufactures or sells an allegedly defective product outside the

45. Barnett, supra note 10, at 135.
46. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 297-98; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 37 (1971)) (holding that jurisdiction
is proper in the state that "is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered" based on the
effects of the defendant's conduct in that state).
47. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851-52 (2011).
48. See id. at 2857.
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it causes loss or
forum, which somehow finds its way into the forum where
5
0
injury. 49 This is the familiar "stream of commerce" problem.
In such stream of commerce cases, how is causality to be assessed? Every
legal subject deserves some sort of realist treatment, and in personal jurisdiction
cases there is no stronger candidate than the issue of causality. All of which is to
say that there is no formal answer to hard questions of causality. Rather, the
decision as to whether a defendant caused an injury in stream of commerce cases
may be mediated in part by aims of personal jurisdiction.
For example, in every stream of commerce case, the defendant will have
caused the accident in a but-for sense: but for the manufacture, distribution, or
sale of the product that caused the injury, the injury would not have occurred.
But stream of commerce cases are tricky precisely because there are strong
intuitions that but-for causality, in and of itself, is insufficient for jurisdiction.
Justice Kennedy picked up on the general form of this intuition in rejecting
foreseeability as a causal criterion in McIntyre:
The owner of a small Florida farm might sell crops to a large nearby
distributor, for example, who might then distribute them to grocers
across the country .... [As a result of which,] the farmer could be sued
in Alaska
or any number of other States' courts without ever leaving
51
town.
Focusing the jurisdictional inquiry on causality in the strict, but-for sense would
likely have the undesirable consequence of opening up manufacturers 'and
distributors of products to the jurisdiction of any state in which their g ods
ultimately end up, however random. 52
Nor do other formulations of causality prove particularly salutary.
Foreseeability, depending on how it is defined, would simply reproduce the
results of but-for causality since it is foreseeable that almost anything that enters
the stream of commerce could start in Florida and end up in Alaska.5 3 Or, to
reference another famous personal jurisdiction case, it is not hard to foresee that

49. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1987)
(describing such a factual scenario).
50. See, e.g., id. at 112 (discussing stream of commerce). Stream of commerce cases have
been the bread and butter of personal jurisdiction scholarship for years. See, e.g., Diane S. Kaplan,
Paddling up the Wrong Stream: Why the Stream of Commerce Theory Is Not Part of the Minimum
Contacts Doctrine, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 503 (2003).

51. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (plurality opinion).
52. The undesirability of this outcome is, of course, contestable. The point is that many,
including the Court in J. McIntyre, and the present authors, hold strong intuitions suggesting its
undesirability. See id. Also note that manufacturers and distributors could pursue counterfactual,
causality defenses: e.g., "even if I hadn't distributed the product, another would have." But the
possibility of litigation over such defenses only reinforces our point: the specter of the attorneys'
fees that would arise from such attempts to predict past futures is undesirable indeed.
53. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion).
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54
a car sold in New York may be driven through another state, like Oklahoma.
The harsh results foreseeability might have for defendants could be lessened by a
move to probability or predictability, but that presents an equally intractable
inquiry: what level of probability is the right one? Ninety percent? Eighty
percent? And more importantly, what criteria would one use to decide the
correct probability?
The point is that there are different formulations of causality available and
the choice among them must be guided by functional, rather than formal,
55
considerations. Even a formal category that could in theory be made precise,
likely6 probability, requires functional considerations to decide where to draw the
Thus, the connection between political justification and causality
line.
becomes apparent: deciding when defendants who sell goods into the stream of
commerce in Florida should be subject to the jurisdiction of Alaska would be
substantially easier if we knew what liberty interests were at stake more
generally.
But critically, the question of political justification need not be resolved in
order to make some progress on issues of causality. A clearer understanding of
some basic policy considerations would be felicitous.
To foreshadow one possible policy contribution: an overly abstemious
understanding of causality, one that limited the inquiry only to the literal actions
of the defendant, would allow the complexities of modem economies to shield
defendants, and perhaps intentionally so. For example, if all that matters are the
literal actions of a defendant that performs all of its actions in state x (e.g., is
headquartered in state x, designs in state x, manufactures in state x, and sells its
products to distributors in state x), then such a defendant could be immune from
suit in state y even if all of its products were sold (by distributors) to end users in
state y. Corporations could prevent liability in states where their products are
most popular, and to the extent that corporate formalities were intact, corporate
veil piercing would offer no solution.
In contrast, an overly broad notion of causality could subject defendants to
suit in a state to which they had only a tangential connection, as would have
happened in Goodyear. A clearer understanding of these policy considerations
would appeal to both courts and commentators. But our point is merely that
clearer functional considerations need to be articulated in order to generate a
more comprehensive grasp of the issues surrounding causality in personal
jurisdiction cases.

54. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295,297 (1980).
55. We say "in theory" because, given sparse data, the statistical feats involved in
determining that a car sold in New York will end up in Oklahoma are formidable.
56. Similarly, using a category like knowledge would be problematic: if an actual showing of
knowledge were the required casual connection, then defendants might shield themselves from
liability through studied ignorance of the destination of their products. If some other form of
knowledge is required (e.g., constructive knowledge), then functional considerations would be
needed to articulate its contours.
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C. Symmetry
This set of questions starts with the observation that the query "which party
should get his/her choice of forum?" is roughly symmetric. If the forum
exercises jurisdiction, then the defendant must travel to the forum to litigate; if
the forum does not exercise jurisdiction, then it is the plaintiff that must travel.
Judges or
This simple symmetry has sometimes been overlooked.
academics who are "plaintiff oriented"-that is, they view limitations on
personal jurisdiction as an irrational nuisance-tend to see the deprivation of a
forum as a serious burden: whatever values can be realized by the lawsuit are
best enabled by giving plaintiffs their choice of forum and are significantly
hindered by limiting that choice. 57 Thus, holding that plaintiffs should not be
able to sue in their chosen forum is tantamount to saying that they should not be
able to sue anywhere at all. This plaintiff-oriented view is often conjoined with
the observation that litigating in a distant forum is, under modern travel
conditions, not such a great imposition on defendants. 58 Proponents of this point
of view tend not to address the fact that modern travel conditions are as helpful
are just as inconvenienced by
to plaintiffs as to defendants, and that defendants
59
an adverse jurisdictional ruling as plaintiffs are.
But, the voices on the other side sometimes make the same mistake.
Defendant-oriented judges and scholars treat defendants as entitled to view state
lines as serious limitations of principle. 6° This is an important argument, but one
that applies as well to plaintiffs. If plaintiffs cannot sue in their preferred state, it
will be necessary for them to travel. Just as with defendants, this is not a
question of convenience only; it is also a question of principle because plaintiffs
must submit themselves to the authority of a sovereign with which they have not

57. See, e.g., McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ("California has a
manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse
to pay claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the
insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable."); Borchers, supra note
21, at 99 ("Perhaps there are some cases in which a defendant is put to the test of defending or
defaulting, and it is economically rational for the defendant to make a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. This much, however, should be clear: if there are such cases, they are few and
far between. Such a motion should require a defendant to show a practical inability to defend.
Beyond that, a defendant must show the availability of some other forum in which the plaintiff can
meaningfully pursue the claim." (footnote omitted)).
58. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
59. In some respects, of course, defendants are worse off than plaintiffs; for example,
plaintiffs are more likely to have access to lawyers on contingent fees, and they also have the first
pick in a case where there is more than one forum that meets due process requirements.
60. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality
opinion) ("[T]hose who live or operate primarily outside a State have a due process right not to be
subjected to judgment in its courts as a general matter."); Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the
Future: Personal Jurisdictionfor the Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 385, 433 (1998)
(taking the argument one step further by suggesting that to truly protect defendants from litigating
in an inconvenient forum the analysis should "be concerned with factors such as a defendant's
wealth and the distance between the court and the defendant's home").
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voluntarily aligned themselves. Whether one sees the question in terms of
sovereignty or convenience, the basic question is symmetric.
It is no response to say that due process protects defendants and not
plaintiffs. The language of the Due Process Clause seems at first to support this
distinction; what is prohibited is deprivation of property, as opposed to the state
failing to provide a forum.61 But plaintiffs have property rights in their causes of
action, and these are protected by due process to almost as great a degree as the
property rights of defendants. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts62 makes this
conclusion explicit: "a chose in action is a constitutionally recognized property
interest possessed by ...plaintiffs. ' 63 And while Phillips Petroleum suggests
that class action plaintiffs have less at stake than class action defendants by
virtue of the mechanics of class action litigation, 64 the scope of that reasoning a
fortiori supports the idea
that individual plaintiffs and individual defendants are
65
symmetrically situated.
The essential symmetry of the problem leads to what might be called the
problem of "reciprocal contacts." In the absence of compelling, principled
reasons to privilege the jurisdictional choices of defendants over plaintiffs, or
vice versa, it makes sense to ask not only whether the defendant has contacts
with the forum, but reciprocally whether the plaintiff has connections with the
alternative forum. From this point of view, the stay-at-home plaintiff has better
chances to prevail in his or her home state than the plaintiff who interacted with
the defendant in another state and then went to the forum. Again, another
famous personal jurisdiction case, World-Wide Volkswagen, exemplifies the
concept.
Lack of appreciation for the problem of reciprocal contacts shows no signs
of abating. For example, in McIntyre, the worry that local Florida farmers may

61. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ... .
62. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
63. Id. at 807 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)).
64. See id. at 808.
65. Every point made with regard to class action defendants applies to individual (but not
class action) plaintiffs. "An out-of-state defendant summoned by a plaintiff is faced with the full
powers of the forum State to render judgment against it." Id. But similarly, jurisdictional
considerations may force an out-of-state individual plaintiff to litigate in a distant forum, and he or
she may be faced with the full powers of the forum State to render judgment against him or her.
"The defendant must generally hire counsel and travel to the forum to defend itself from the
plaintiff's claim, or suffer a default judgment." Id. But similarly, an out-of-state individual plaintiff
must hire counsel and travel to the forum to prosecute his or her claim or suffer the inability to
realize on that claim. The point is that every argument applied to defendants applies equally to
individualplaintiffs.
66. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288-89 (1980). The
Robinsons had substantial contact with New York, where they purchased their car, and Oklahoma,
where the accident precipitating the suit occurred, while the defendants had no identifiable contact
with Oklahoma other than selling the car to the Robinsons. Id. A reciprocal contacts analysis
would thus identify New York as the appropriate forum. See discussion infra.
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be subject to suit in Alaska 67 should evince a reciprocal concern about local,
Alaska-locked consumers who have to sue in Florida to vindicate their property
rights. But it does not. 68 The problem of reciprocal contacts suggests three
possible futures. First, courts or scholars could develop principled reasons to
focus on defendants over plaintiffs; second, courts or scholars could develop
principled reasons to prefer plaintiffs over defendants; or third, courts and
scholars could begin to work reciprocal contacts analyses into problems of
personal jurisdiction. 69 In the absence of a fully articulated political justification
for personal jurisdiction (i.e., what liberty interest is really at stake in asserting
jurisdiction), the first two possible futures are likely to reproduce the rigidity
that arises from existing arguments as to the proper balance the law should strike
between plaintiffs and defendants. We are, therefore, most sanguine about the
third possible future.
Where the defendant meets the "minimum contacts" threshold, it should not
be necessary to ask, in addition, whether the plaintiff has contacts with the
alternative forum. The question of reciprocal contacts may be influential,
however, when the defendant has few contacts or they are of dubious
significance. For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen, it probably mattered that
the plaintiffs had connections with the place that the car was bought; the
plaintiffs bought the car in New York, were en route to the southwest, and had
their accident on the way. 71 Although the defendant would have had to travel if
the case was brought in Oklahoma, the plaintiff would have had to travel if the
case was held in New York. Equipoise between the interests of the plaintiffs and
the defendants would thus require the plaintiffs to cross state lines and sue in
New York. Depending on the proper treatment of foreign defendants for
constitutional purposes, 72 a similar analysis could obtain a similar result in
Goodyear where the (estates of the) decedents, represented by the plaintiffs,
arguably had far more contact with France than the defendants did with North
Carolina.73
D. InternationalDue Process

We do not have a clear answer to the question of whether interstate cases
and international cases should be treated the same for constitutional purposes.
There are many cases that seem to apply international and interstate precedents
interchangeably. Goodyear, for example, noted simply that the defendants

67.
68.
69.
contacts.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 2791.
Of course, a fourth possible future is continued disregard for the problem of reciprocal
See
See
See
See

supra Part I.A.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
infra Part I.D.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851-52 (2011).
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contesting jurisdiction were foreign (international) subsidiaries of a U.S. parent
(which did not itself contest jurisdiction) and that "[a] state court's assertion of
jurisdiction exposes defendants to the State's coercive power, and is therefore
subject to review for compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause., 74 In the general jurisdiction context, Goodyeareven suggested
the interchangeability of domestic and foreign out-of-state defendants by
parenthetical explanation: "A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign
(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against
them ....
For the sake of clarity, we will use the word foreign in this
discussion to refer only to non-U.S. persons or entities.
This general equivalence between foreign and domestic defendants in the
personal jurisdiction context is punctuated by the occasional suggestion that
For example, in rejecting
foreign defendants are qualitatively different.
California's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a Japanese tire valve
manufacturer, the Court in Asahi emphasized the distance between Japan and
California as well the challenges of mounting an international defense: "The
unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal
system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of
stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders. 76
Yet, the idea that foreign nationals acting in foreign countries can claim U.S.
constitutional rights is both highly controversial and contrary to other Supreme
Court precedent. Indeed, there are cases that would appear to hold that
defendants who are not citizens of the United States have no due process rights
when on foreign soil. These arise in a rather different context: the war on drugs
and the war on terror.7 7 A prime example here is United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, which held that a Mexican citizen acting and living on Mexican soil
could not invoke the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on search and seizure,
even when the search was conducted (with the permission of the Mexican
government) by agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. 78 By analogy,

74. Id. at 2850 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
75. Id. at 2851.
76. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
77. See, e.g., Boumediene v Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008) (determining that foreign
citizens detained as combatants by executive order are entitled to habeas proceedings that "need not
resemble a criminal trial" but must be sufficient to "conduct a meaningful review of both the cause
for detention and the Executive's power to detain"). Note that a critical difference between the
chain of reasoning pursued in this Article and recent war on terror cases (particularly involving
Guantanamo) is that in those cases, the actions may or may not have taken place on foreign soil and
here, we are assuming that the relevant actions take place, and the defendants abide, unambiguously
on foreign soil.
78. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261-62, 274-75 (1990) ("We think
that the text of the Fourth Amendment, its history, and our cases discussing the application of the
Constitution to aliens and extraterritorially require rejection of respondent's claim. At the time of the
search, he was a citizen and resident of Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States,
and the place searched was located in Mexico. Under these circumstances, the Fourth Amendment
has no application.").
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Verdugo-Urquidez suggests that foreign nationals on foreign soil should not have
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.79
The two sets of cases are puzzlingly alike. Both due process/personal
jurisdiction and the war on terror/war on drugs cases involve defendants who ask
simply to be left alone. But of all the outstanding issues in personal jurisdiction,
this is perhaps the most tractable: the treatment of foreign nationals in foreign
countries really is an open question, highlighted by the doctrinal dissonance we
have just described.
We suspect that the equivalence between foreign and domestic defendants in
personal jurisdiction cases is best understood as an example of adaptive reuse.
For a whole host of reasons-including basic nationalistic impulses, separation
of powers and federalism in the conduct of trade and foreign affairs, and the
economic efficiencies enabled both by foreign trade and the outsourcing of
product components (e.g., the tire valves manufactured in Asahi)-the federal
courts are wary of giving state courts jurisdiction over certain sets of foreign
defendants, particularly when the state courts would lack jurisdiction over the
defendants if they were merely located in another state. The Due Process Clause
and the doctrines that have developed around personal jurisdiction are a highly
convenient way to remove jurisdiction from state courts, even if doing so means
ascribing due process protection to foreigners acting in foreign countries and
creating dissonance with other areas of constitutional law.
Given the foregoing, two further sets of questions dare answers. First, is our
adaptive reuse theory correct? If so, exactly what are the motivating reasons for
extending due process to foreign defendants acting in foreign countries? And if
not, what is the motivation for so extending due process? 80 It could be that
personal jurisdiction is just a special, sui generis sub-category of constitutional
right, but why would that be? The second set would work out the constitutional
implications of extending due process rights to foreigners acting in foreign
countries. What are the implications for other constitutional rights foreigners
might claim? And are there other constitutional avenues that could substitute for
personal jurisdiction in preventing state jurisdiction over certain sets of foreign
defendants?

79. See id. at 269, 274-75. The Court based its reasoning in Verdugo-Urquidez in part on
Johnson v. Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950), which held that foreign nationals were not entitled to
habeas corpus under the Fifth Amendment while in custody in Germany. See Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. at 269 (quoting Johnson, 339 U.S. at 784). "If such is true of the Fifth Amendment [i.e., it
does not apply to foreign nationals on foreign soil even when they are under U.S. control], which
speaks in the relatively universal term of 'person,' it would seem even more true with respect to the
Fourth Amendment, which applies only to 'the people."' Id. The Fourteenth Amendment's due
process protections similarly apply to "person[s]." See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "(emphasis
added)).
80. Note that it is no answer to contend that out-of-state foreign and domestic defendants just
are similarly situated, because the exact same response could be given to the denial of constitutional
rights in Verdugo-Urquidez.
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CONCLUSION

Personal jurisdiction is a rewarding area of scholarship precisely because
many of the problems appear intractable but, in spite of appearances, are subject
to refinement and contribution. In this Paper, we have limned what we think are
the lodestars of personal jurisdiction over the next few decades: the need for a
fully articulated political justification, causality, symmetry, and international due
process. Robust development of any one of these issues would constitute a
strong future, both for the doctrine of personal jurisdiction and for those of us
who are j urisdiction-junkies.
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